

# **NEPC PRIVATE DEBT TEAM**



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
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# 2025 NEPC PRIVATE DEBT OUTLOOK

As we head into 2025, investors should be cognizant of the various ways the private debt markets have expanded and evolved over the past year. Deal activity is expected to increase, which would bode well for new deployment as well as refinancings and realizations in existing portfolios. However, the third year of elevated rates, increased competition, industry consolidation and growth of different types of implementation vehicles are reasons for heightened emphasis of manager selection.

**Transitional Capital:** As elevated rates continue, there is now a split between "Have vs. Have Nots". While higher quality companies should be able to find cheaper capital, those that have not grown into their capital structures or face liquidity challenges may have difficulty accessing traditional financing. The deals are a more customized form of financing, allowing managers to create highly structured deals with built-in **optionality** that offers GPs: 1) higher overall return premiums through complexity and/or upside participation and 2) better protections with more control especially around exits.

**Bank Displacement Continues**: Due to regulatory pressure, banks continue to pull back from several markets. The **financing gaps being left behind provide opportunities** for private debt managers to step in and offer alternative solutions for borrowers.

**Portfolio Finance:** There has been an increase in strategies designed to address the lack of realizations across private markets. LPs and GPs alike are increasingly seeking bespoke solutions to help them achieve asset-level, portfolio-level and/or other strategic goals. While deal flow has been muted in the past, this opportunity has **started to materialize**.



## **2025 PRIVATE DEBT THEMES**

Year 3 of higher rates as well as continued regulatory developments will provide interesting new opportunities but also challenge existing portfolios in 2025...

...These factors continue to put stress on existing capital structures, accelerated bank retrenchment and create portfolio concerns...

#### **Transitional Capital**

Bank Displacement Continues...

Private Markets
Liquidity: Portfolio
Finance



 Opportunistic Direct Lending

- Asset-Based Lending
- Europe

- Credit Secondaries
- GP/LP Structured Solutions




# **2025 PRIVATE DEBT THEMES**

Theme	Overview	Merits	Risks	Implementation
Transitional Capital	Companies have not been able to reinvest or grow; double digit interest expense has consumed a significant amount of liquidity in 2024  Borrowers are in need of creative/bespoke financing solutions	Optionality: Lenders have negotiating power to drive more favorable terms including better protections and, in some cases, equity upside	Subordination/priming Lack of equity support Poor deal structuring Lender-on-lender violence Sponsor-on-lender violence	Benefit to Client Portfolios Return enhancement Strategy Options Opportunistic Direct Lending Opportunistic credit Distressed/stressed
Bank Displacement Continues	Due to regulatory pressure, banks continue to pull back from several markets  Investment types include single asset loan originations, whole loan portfolios, securitizations, non-performing loans, specialty finance, non-bank originators, etc.	Private debt managers can partner with banks to create mutually beneficial solutions  Lenders can gain access to potentially high-quality borrowers/assets that otherwise would not typically be available	Poor credit selection Selectivity/adverse selection Incorrectly valuing or understanding collateral Potential for limited control of a workout/restructuring	Benefit to Client Portfolios Diversification Return enhancement Strategy Options Asset-based lending European private debt
Private Markets Liquidity: Portfolio Finance	LPs are in search of capital solutions for portfolio management reasons (ex. liquidity needs, rebalancing, etc.) and strategic goals (ex. change in mandate, relieve administrative burden, etc.)  GPs are seeking financing for fund & asset-level purposes (ex. extend duration to maximize value, crystalize performance, etc.) and strategic goals (ex. balance sheet capital, develop new product offerings, etc.)	A significant increase in total deal flow, coupled with a broader opportunity set in terms of new forms of deal structures, enables managers to be more selective with investments and hopefully achieve better risk adjusted returns	Counterparty risk Inadequate price discount Misalignment/poor deal structuring Underperformance of underlying portfolio companies	Benefit to Client Portfolios Diversification Shorter duration  Strategy Options Credit secondaries Structured solutions



# **NEPC PRIVATE DEBT TAXONOMY**






\*Healthcare/Music/Film/Media/Energy & Minerals royalties

# **STRATEGY SELECTION**


#### **CASHFLOW & RETURN PROFILE**





## PRIVATE DEBT ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT

CONTINUED GROWTH BUT STILL MEANINGFULLY TRAILS PE






Source: Pregin as of 10/2024

# PUBLIC MARKET EQUIVALENT ("PME")

CONSISTENT OUTPERFORMANCE BUT NOT ENTIRELY CYCLE TESTED





PD Out/Under-performance is shown based on a PME using the pooled cash flows of all funds across Private Credit

PME method is Direct Alpha and benchmark is BofA HY Index as of 06/30/2024


No NEPC clients are in vested in these exact strategies and have not achieved these returns – for illustrative purposes only.





# **DIRECT LENDING PERFORMANCE**

#### RELATIVELY STABLE OVER TIME






Source: Preqin as of 09/30/2024

No NEPC clients are in vested in these exact strategies and have not achieved these returns - for illustrative purposes only.

## **FUNDRAISING**

#### DIRECT LENDING IN-LINE YOY WHILE OTHER STRATEGIES LAG






Source: Pregin as of 10/2024

**Exhibit A: Page 14** 

## **M&A ACTIVITY**

#### PRIVATE CAPITAL M&A DECLINING SINCE RATE HIKES BEGAN






Source: Fred (Annual Average), Pitchbook Q2 2024 Global M&A Report, Q2 2024 US PE Breakdown

# PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE YIELD COMPARISON


#### MIDDLE MARKET YIELDS STILL GENERATING PREMIUM





## SPREAD PER UNIT OF LEVERAGE

MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES STILL BETTER PROTECTED IN HIGHER RATE ENVIRONMENT






Source: LSEG LPC

## **RECOVERY RATES**

#### MIDDLE MARKET DIRECT LENDING DEMONSTRATES RESILIENCE






Middle Market Loans (<\$350m of Debt) Larger Companeis (>\$350m of Debt)





## **PERFORMANCE**

#### HEIGHTENED IMPORTANCE ON MANAGER SELECTION






Source: Thomson One/C|A as of 06/30/2024

No NEPC clients are in vested in these exact strategies and have not achieved these returns - for illustrative purposes only.

## **FUNDRAISING**


## 2024 DECLINE FOR NON-DIRECT LENDING STRATEGIES





## **INSTITUTIONAL LOAN MARKET**

#### **DEFAULT RATE IS RISING**





Source: LSEG LPC's Distressed Market Review as of October 2024



## INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION

#### WHAT ARE THE CONCERNS?

# ALIGNMENT OF INCENTIVES

- GPs: AUM growth and product proliferation
- LPs: Investment performance and fees

#### **HUMAN CAPITAL**


- Distracted from deployment/monitoring
- Talent exiting the firm

# PERFORMANCE DETERIORATION

- Maintaining discipline
- Adverse selection



## "HYBRID FUNDS"










## INTEREST COVERAGE ON LEVERAGED LOANS


#### WORSENING AS RATES REMAIN ELEVATED





# **ENTERPRISE VALUE AT VARIOUS WACC'S**

#### **EQUITY VALUES CONTINUE TO GET SQUEEZED**






Source: TPG Angelo Gordon analysis.

## LIABILITY MANAGEMENT EXERCISES

#### **VOLUME IS INCREASING**






Source: J.P. Morgan

# **IMPACT OF RATE OUTLOOK**

RATE CUTS WILL NOT UNILATERALLY SOLVE BROKEN CAPITAL STRUCTURES



Change in Fed Funds Rate in Next 24
Months

Interest Coverage Ratios									
	Change in Interest Rates								
		-200bp	-100bp	-50bp	Current	+50bp	+100bp		
	30%	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2		
Change in EBITDA	20%	2.6	2.3	2.2	2	1.9	1.9		
	10%	2.4	2.1	2	1.9	1.8	1.7		
	0%	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5		
	-10%	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4		
	-20%	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2		
	-30%	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1		



Source: BofA Global Research, Citi Research, FTSE Indices





## DIFFERENT TYPES OF ASSET-BASED LENDING

#### DIRECT ORIGINATION VS. STRUCTURED FINANCE

## **Direct Origination**

- Direct loans to corporate borrowers
  - Usually structured as term loans
- Primarily incremental liquidity and transition capital
- Portfolios typically consist of one pool of diversified, directlyoriginated loans

VS.

#### **Structured Finance**


- Structure of purchase of cash flow streams generated by a physical or financial asset
- Financing to third-party originators
- Loan & lease portfolio acquisitions
- Acquisition of origination platforms
- Sometimes referred to as assetbacked securitization

Note: Both investment types may present in ABL funds



# **ASSET-BASED LENDING EXPOSURES**

## WIDE SPECTRUM OF ASSETS






## **BANK BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION**

ASSET-BASED EXPOSURE IS MAJORITY OF HOLDINGS; UP FOR GRABS AS BANKS RETREAT

Loan Holdings of Small & Regional US Banks (<\$250 billion)





# **ASSET-BASED LENDING**

## **DIVERSIFICATION BENEFITS**

	Agency RMBS	CMBX AAA	CMBX BBB	Auto Loan ABS	Credit Card ABS	Student Loan ABS	CDX IG	CDX HY
Agency RMBS		0.34	0.89	0.71	0.54	0.57	0.35	0.69
CMBX AAA	0.34		0.34	0.46	0.72	0.58		0.52
CMBX BBB	0.89	0.34		0.85	0.59	0.80	0.45	0.81
Auto Loans ABS	0.71	0.46	0.85		0.84	0.90		0.92
Credit Card ABS	0.54	0.72	0.59	0.84		0.79		0.76
Student Loan ABS	0.57	0.58	0.80	0.90			0.76	0.88
CDX IG	0.35	0.74	0.45	0.65		0.76		0.84
CDX HY	0.69	0.52	0.81	0.92	0.76	0.88	0.84	
Average Correlation	0.58	0.53	0.68	0.76	0.70	0.76	0.64	0.77



Note: Correlations are based on asset-level returns between 1/25/2013 and 01/22/2024. Source: Bloomberg, Markit, Haver Analytics, ICE-BAML, Goldman Sachs GIR, TPG.



# **EUROPEAN BANK RETRENCHMENT**

REASONS



Larger Existing Exposure to Corporate Lending Relative to U.S. Peers

- 2
- **Higher Level of Risk Capital Requirements**

3

Larger Existing Exposure to Commercial Real Estate Relative to U.S. Peers



Lower Profitability and Valuations Compared to U.S. Peers



# US VS. EUROPE PRIVATE CAPITAL

#### LESS PENETRATION AND COMPETITION IN EUROPE





Source: Preqin as of 09/2024



# **PORTFOLIO FINANCE**

	Use of Proceeds	Collateral	Underlying Strategies	Key Lenders
Subscription Lines	Cash Management Acquisition Financing	Uncalled Capital Commitments	All	Banks Insurance
Hybrid Facilities	Cash Management Acquisition Financing Leverage/Fund Recapitalization Return of Capital Alternative to LBO and IPO Support of Portfolio Companies	Uncalled Capital Commitments + Fund Positions	Primarily Buyout	Banks Insurance Asset Managers
NAV Lending	Cash Management Acquisition Financing Leverage/Fund Recapitalization Return of Capital Alternative to LBO and IPO Support of Portfolio Companies	Fund Positions	Primarily Buyout, with increasing activities in Credit, Real Estate, Infrastructure and Venture Capital	Banks Insurance Asset Managers
Credit Secondaries	Cash Management Acquisition Financing Leverage/Fund Recapitalization Return of Capital Alternative to LBO and IPO Support of Portfolio Companies	Diversified Pool of Private Funds	Primarily Buyout, with increasing activities in Credit, Real Estate, Infrastructure and Venture Capital	Banks Insurance Asset Managers
GP Solutions	Fundraising needs Non-dilutive Strategic Capital Raises Leverage for GP Commitments	Management Fees + GP Commitments	All	Asset Managers
CFOs	Regulatory Capital Efficiency Leverage/Recapitalization of Fund Portfolios	One or More Private Funds	All	Insurance Asset Managers



# **TAILWINDS FOR INCREASED DEAL ACTIVITY**

LP Portfolio I	Management	GP Fund & Asset Level Solutions			
Short-Term Liquidity Needs Portfolio Rebalancing		Extend Duration to Maximize Asset Value	Maintain AUM base while generating liquidity for LPs		
Accelerate Distributions	Reduce Unfunded Liabilities	Crystallize Performance	Finance GP Commitment		

Strateg	ic Goals	Strategic Goals				
Change in Investment Mandate	Ownership/Managerial Changes	Seek Permanent B/S Capital	Address Succession Planning Concerns			
Generate Dry Powder to Support New Commitments	Relieve Administrative Burden	Develop New Product Offerings	Explore Growth Capital Alternatives			



# **AGING PRIVATE EQUITY ASSETS**

■ 6+ Years ■ 4-6 Years ■ 0-3 Years

#### IN NEED OF CREATIVE EXITS OR REFINANCINGS

...Due to Challenged Monetization **Private Equity Assets Have Aged** (Number of Companies) **Paths** Sale To **Unrealized NAV Draws Dry** Powder; **Financial Challenged Financing Sponsor** 7,173, **Environment** 26% **Regulatory Environment Less** 14,853, Sale to Hospitable; 54% **Valuation Expectation Strategic Mismatches** 5,581, 20% **Recent IPO's Have Struggled; Public Exit IPO Discounts Creating Valuation** Gaps



Source: Pitchbook, 2024 Bain & Company Global Private Equity Report. Excludes add-ons; time in portfolio: "0-3 years" means the investments were made in 2020 and onward, "4-6 years" means the investments were made in 2017-2019, "6+ years" means the investments were made prior to 2017.



## **OVERVIEW**

The emergence of private credit secondaries is part an organic evolution of the asset class.



Secondary transactions typically require mature portfolios and/or periods of market volatility.




These transactions within private credit have been limited because this is a relatively nascent asset class, born out of the GFC, and over that timeframe it has been a relatively benign credit environment (outside of the short-lived COVID volatility).



The opportunity set is expected to broaden with the adoption of new and innovative structures/solutions within the space, and deal flow is expected to increase due to several tailwinds.



## **ADDRESSING THE MARKET NEED**



Limited liquidity for active portfolio management

Unpredictable pace of distributions

Slow reaction to market dislocations

Fluid regulatory environments

Need to rebalance allocations

Difficulty crystallizing returns




# **BENEFITS TO INVESTORS**

#### LP-LED AND GP-LED PRIVATE CREDIT SECONDARIES







# PRIVATE MARKETS INVESTING

#### **BEST PRACTICES**



Strategic targets are encouraged but don't be dogmatic



Pacing plans are a critical portfolio management and risk management tool



Private markets are long-term investments and should not be used express tactical investment views



Re-up with strong managers



Ensure overall asset allocation has enough true liquidity to meet calls and spending



If you are early in your private markets investment journey, or building out a larger allocation, know that it will take time





# **VEHICLE STRUCTURE PROLIFERATION**

### **COMMON OFFERINGS**

Vehicle Structure	Definition	Suitability
Closed-End	Vehicles with finite committed capital, investment periods and overall fund terms	For investors that prefer clarity around capital deployment and distribution timelines
Evergreen	Open-ended vehicles allowing for continuous capital raising with no fund term explicitly stated	For investors prioritizing ongoing exposure to underlying investments or those seeking to limit the administrative burden of making frequent fund commitments
Rated-Note	Vehicles issue debt securities (notes) that are rated by credit rating agencies based on the quality of the underlying portfolio and the structure of the vehicle	For investors subject to regulatory capital charges on assets (ex. insurance companies)
ERISA Fiduciary/QPAM	Vehicles where the GP assumes heightened responsibilities and legal obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974	For investors subject to ERISA regulations (ex. Taft-Hartley or corporate pensions)



# BROADLY SYNDICATED LOADS VS. MIDDLE MARKET


BEWARE OF CONCENTRATION AT THE LARGER END OF THE MARKET...

	Power- School	Catalent	Adevinta	Ardonagh	PDI	Hyland	BradylFS	Baxter	Cotiviti	Coupa	Avalara	Zendesk	Kaseya
	\$3.2b	\$4.8b	\$4.9b	\$3.3b	\$1.3b	\$3.4b	\$2.7b	\$2.0b	\$5.5b	\$2.6b	\$2.8b	\$5.0b	\$3.7b
Antares Capital		Х		Х	Х		X	X					
APOLLO		Х	Х						Х	Х	Х	Х	
ØARES	Х	Х		Х	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Blackstone	Х	Х	Х		Х		Х	X	Х	Х		Х	X
BLUE OWL	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Х
GOLUB CAPITAL	Х	Х			Х	X	Х			X	X	Х	X
HPS	X	х		Х				X	X	X	X	X	



Source: Sources: Bloomberg; Direct Lending Deals, a publication of Capital Stack Publishing, LLC; LSEG; 9fin; Pitchbook, Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD). Does not necessarily represent complete lender group for any transaction.

# **DISPERSION IN CORPORATES**






- 1. Weighted average bid price of US Leveraged Loans.
- 2. Loan Market Data below \$80 is as of August 31, 2024. Volume is in billions.



## **BIFURCATION IN THE MARKET**

#### MARKET DIVIDED BY THE "HAVES" AND "HAVE NOTS"





Source: BofA Global Research

# ASSET-BASED LENDING ANS TRADITIONAL DIRECT LENDING

**HOW IS ABL DIFFERENT?** 

	Asset-Based Lending	Traditional Direct Lending (Cash Flow/Enterprise Value Lending)
Collateral Base for Loan	Borrower's assets (e.g., PP&E, inventory, accounts receivable, etc.)	Borrower's enterprise value generally predicated on its ability to generate future cash flow
Basis for Determining Borrowing Capacity	A percentage of the value of various assets or loan-to-value (LTV) which is regularly monitored and modified	Multiple of borrower's cash flow/EBITDA which is set at the initiation of the loan
Repayment	Loans are typically self-amortizing over time	Loans are largely bullet repayment at maturity
Ability to Achieve Full Loan Recovery	Independent of borrower's performance	Dependent on borrower's performance and health of credit markets to refinance
Return Drivers	Principal, interest and fees, and the monetization of borrower's assets if in default	Principal, interest and fees
Competition	More of a niche market; less dedicated firms and funds	Represents a majority share of the U.S. small to mid sized corporate loan market




# **BASEL II VS. BASEL III**

#### ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR BANKS

Minimum Capital Requirements	BASEL II	BASEL III		
Common Equity Tier 1	N/A	4.5%		
Minimum Tier 1 Capital	4.0%	6.0%		
Minimum Total Capital	8.0%	8.0%		
Leverage Ratio	None	4.0%		
Supplemental Leverage Ratio	None	3.0%		
Capital Conservation Buffer	None	2.5%		
Counter Cyclical Buffer	None	0% to 2.5%		
Liquidity Poquiroments	None	Liquidity Coverage Ratio		
Liquidity Requirements	None	<b>Net Stable Funding Ratio</b>		

# Basel II vs Basel III Capital Requirements






Source: Fitch Ratings U.S. Basel III and Dodd Frank Act Regulatory Guide as of July 2022; David Polk U.S. Basel III Final Rule: Visual Memorandum as of April 2015; Corporate Finance Institute

# **BUSINESS MODEL COMPARISON**

#### INEFFICIENCY OF BANK MODEL





Note: For illustrative purposes only. Capital structures are demonstrative examples and not representative of a specific business.

# **NEPC DISCLOSURES**

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

All investments carry some level of risk. Diversification and other asset allocation techniques do not ensure profit or protect against losses.

Some of the information presented herein has been obtained from external sources NEPC believes to be reliable. While NEPC has exercised reasonable professional care in preparing this content, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of all source information contained within.

The opinions presented herein represent the good faith views of NEPC as of the publication date and are subject to change at any time.

This presentation contains summary information regarding the investment management approaches described herein but is not a complete description of the investment objectives, portfolio management and research that supports these approaches. This analysis does not constitute a recommendation to implement any of the aforementioned approaches.



# **ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT DISCLOSURES**

It is important that investors understand the following characteristics of non-traditional investment strategies including hedge funds and private equity:

- 1. Performance can be volatile and investors could lose all or a substantial portion of their investment
- 2. Leverage and other speculative practices may increase the risk of loss
- 3. Past performance may be revised due to the revaluation of investments
- 4. These investments can be illiquid, and investors may be subject to lock-ups or lengthy redemption terms
- 5. A secondary market may not be available for all funds, and any sales that occur may take place at a discount to value
- 6. These funds are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as registered investment vehicles
- 7. Managers may not be required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors
- 8. These funds may have complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information
- 9. These funds often charge high fees
- 10. Investment agreements often give the manager authority to trade in securities, markets or currencies that are not within the manager's realm of expertise or contemplated investment strategy



