## Portfolio Review: Though the Looking Glass

Gina Sanchez
Primary Consultant
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## Agenda

।. Building a Risk Budget
II. Asset Class Landscape
III. Economic Regime Considerations
iv. Economic Scenario Review
v. Portfolio Observations

## Building a Risk Budget

The Investment Roadmap Starts with
Understanding Risk

## Determining Risk Capacity

>Time Horizon
>Cashflow
>Mitigating Factors

## Time Horizon

>The longer the time horizon, the lower the observed volatility.


## Direction of Cashflow

>Direction of cashflows exacerbate sequential risk.


## Positive Cashflow

>Positive Cashflows increase the ability to take risk.


## Negative Cashflow

>Negative Cashflows decrease the ability to take risk more than the positive helps.


## Rigidity of Cashflow

>In an up market, it pays to delay cashflows to allow investments to grow.

Up Market



## Rigidity of Cashflow

>In down market, it pays to get the cashflows out as early as possible before the investment pool shrinks.

Down Market


## Mitigating Factors

>Diversification allows the CIO to sell higher priced assets to meet outflows and make investments into lower priced assets with inflows.
>The trade off toward illiquid assets boosts expected returns; however, it also reduces the ability to mitigate cashflow impacts through diversification as only the liquid pool is available.

## Risk Capacity Scorecard

Time Horizon



## Direction of Cashflow

$\square$

Rigidity of Cashflow

Diversification

Liquidity

## Asset Class Landscape

Reviewing Asset Class Risk
Characteristics

## Understanding the Risk Reward Landscape



The relationship between risk and return is complex. Not all risks are rewarded with high returns, but higher returns inevitably require higher risk. Diversification for diversification sake is not always a recipe for the most efficient portfolio. That said, sometimes, adding less efficient asset classes can yield a safer portfolio over time.

## A Tale of Two Decades - Part I



The relationship between risk and return is complex. Not all risks are rewarded with high returns, but higher returns inevitably require higher risk. Diversification for diversification sake is not always a recipe for the most efficient portfolio. That said, sometimes, adding less efficient asset classes can yield a safer portfolio over time.

## A Tale of Two Decades - Part II



The relationship between risk and return is complex. Not all risks are rewarded with high returns, but higher returns inevitably require higher risk. Diversification for diversification sake is not always a recipe for the most efficient portfolio. That said, sometimes, adding less efficient asset classes can yield a safer portfolio over time.

## Good Portfolio Design Trades Off Growth for Stability



## Correlations Are Not Dependable



Investment Name

- CRSP US Total Market TR USD (Correlation)
- MSCI ACWI Ex USA NR USD (Correlation)
- BEgEarc Gbl Agg Ex USD TR USD (Correlation)
- BEgBarc US Agg Bond TR USD (Correlation)
- A single snapshot of correlation does not reveal the instability of this relationship over time.
- US bonds vary around a slightly negative correlation, but the experience suggests that the actual correlation ranges from 0.5 to -0.5 , which are two very different portfolio impacts.
- Global bonds vary around a slightly higher correlation and skew more positively at times.
- International stocks are persistently high, providing little diversification benefit.


## The Ultimate Goal Must Be To Avoid Fat Tails



## Economic Regime

 ConsiderationsHeadwinds and Tailwinds

## Uncorrelated Economic Regimes

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { N } \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  | 앙 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 오 } \\ & \frac{5}{4} \\ & \frac{1}{0} \\ & 4 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GDP (Growing) | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade Volume (Growing) | 0.25 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Earnings (Growing) | -0.05 | 0.02 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CPI (Increasing) | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oil (Above Average) | -0.05 | -0.17 | 0.00 | -0.28 | 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| Dollar (Strengthening) | -0.06 | -0.14 | -0.02 | -0.07 | 0.36 | 1.00 |  |  |  |
| Rates (Rising) | -0.08 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 1.00 |  |  |
| Fed Balance Sheet (Expanding) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.01 | -0.12 | -0.06 | -0.16 | 1.00 |  |
| Asset Inflation (Positive) | 0.13 | 0.03 | -0.03 | -0.09 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 1.00 |

- We evaluate the available asset classes under nine low to uncorrelated US economic regimes.
- The regimes are grouped into three broad groups: demand measures, cost measure and policy measures
- Each economic regime is measured monthly.
- Seven of the nine measures are directional. Directional measures measure the direction of the variable movement (ie rising, strengthening, growing, increasing, expanding) and do not differentiate regarding absolute measures (positive/negative, high/low, toward/away from mean, toward/away from trend).
- One measure, oil, is measured relative to the previous rolling three-year mean (above or below).
- The last measure, Asset Inflation, is measured as the change in money supply (M2) versus the change in CPI for the same month. This is an absolute measure (positive or negative).


## Unfiltered Data from June 2000 to June 2020



| Strongest | Weakest |
| :---: | :---: |
| US Bonds | Foreign Stocks |
| Foreign Bonds | Private Equity |
| High Yield Bonds | Commodity |

## Demand - Earnings Growth



## Oil Above 3 Year Average



## Fed Balance Sheet Expanding



## SBCERA Alpha Portfolio Exposures (as of 6/30/20)



## SBCERA Beta Portfolio Exposures (as of 6/30/20)



## SBCERA Policy Portfolio Exposures (as of 6/30/20)



## SBCERA Relative Exposures (as of 6/30/20)



## SBCERA Portfolio Preference Scorecard

|  |  | 잉 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Capture | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Rank Improvement | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Drawdown | -16.4 | -16.4 | -16.3 | -9.9 | -16.4 | -16.4 | -8.0 | -16.4 | -16.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Symmetry | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |

> The current portfolio positioning shows no significant preference in various demand driven scenario. However, the portfolio does demonstrate market biases in policy and inflation scenarios.
$>$ The portfolio design has a heavy preference for asset price inflation and economic recovery/rising rate scenarios.
> In recovery/rising rates scenarios, domestic and international equity along with private equity show strong performance.
> Meanwhile, asset price inflation benefits the broad portfolio except for real assets.
$>$ Scenarios that feature rising oil prices or a strengthening dollar pose challenges to the current positioning.
> Rising oil hurts all public and private equity as well as real assets while the rising dollar only hurts international equity and European high yield.

## SBCERA Portfolio Preference Scorecard

|  |  | Oे 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  | 오 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 |  | 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br>  <br>  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Capture | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Rank Improvement | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Drawdown | -16.4 | -16.4 | -16.3 | -9.9 | -16.4 | -16.4 | -8.0 | -16.4 | -16.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Symmetry | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |

$>$ In evaluating the relative positioning of the portfolio, we evaluated the beta positioning of the liquid portfolio as that determines the potential for value added in the portfolio overaly program.
$>$ In this analysis, we evaluate the relative positioning of the liquid portfolio and dermine, under various scenarios, if the relative positioning will help or hurt the overall ranking versus the policy portfolio.
$>$ In every scenario, we observe modest improvement in the ranking of the portfolio.
$>$ The improvements are small commensurate with the size of the bets.
$>$ The best results come in the growing GDP scenario as well as the expanding Fed Balance Sheet scenario.
> Perhaps the most persistent observations comes from the underweight in US Investment Grade Bonds, which tends to land at the top of the performance spectrum on a risk adjusted basis. However, this is mitigated by the desire for income, which investment grade bonds do not provide.

## SBCERA Portfolio Preference Scorecard

|  |  | 앙 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 |  | Earnings（Growing） | $\begin{aligned} & \text { O} \\ & \text { ⿹弋工 } \\ & 0 \\ & 0 . \\ & \vdots \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br>  <br>  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Capture | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | －0．7 | －0．8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio <br> Rank Improvement | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Drawdown | －16．4 | －16．4 | －16．3 | －9．9 | －16．4 | －16．4 | －8．0 | －16．4 | －16．5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Symmetry | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |

＞Given the portfolio sensitivity to adverse events，the ability to reduce the drawdown is considered a valuable feature．
＞Most scenarios，however，feature roughly the same drawdown characteristics across the board，so considering these effects makes more sense by asset class than by scenario（see Appendix）．
$>$ Both domestic and global fixed income along with the alpha pool largely improve the drawdown profile of the portfolio．
＞From a scenario perspective，the recovery scenarios reduce the tail risk of the portfolio along with rising inflation scenarios for the same reason．
＞The remaining scenarios are largely similar in their lack of drawdown improvement．

## SBCERA Portfolio Preference Scorecard

|  |  | Oे 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  | ㅇ <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 |  | 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 <br>  <br>  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Capture | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | Information Ratio Rank Improvement | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Drawdown | -16.4 | -16.4 | -16.3 | -9.9 | -16.4 | -16.4 | -8.0 | -16.4 | -16.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | Symmetry | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |

$>$ Symmetry impact measures the degree to which the upside improves or the downside is reduced across the portfolio in the scenarios.
$>$ The symmetry is greatly impacted by the presence of cash, which is positively skewed asset class.
$>$ Excluding the impact of cash, it is worth noting that international and emerging markets equity tend to add negative skew to the portfolio outcomes.
$>$ Fixed income, both domestic and foreign, more than offset the equity impacts with more than twice the amount of positive skew.
$>$ Looking across the scenario, the Fed Balance Sheet expansion scenario sets up the most potential for negatively skewed events across the portfolio and would be the scenario element to watch out for.
$>$ Increasing inflation is the most balanced across the asset classes with little effects to any single asset classes.
$>$ On balance, the portfolio is designed with strong symmetry characteristics to help manage risk across scenarios.

## Economic Scenario Review

Possible Portfolio Paths

## Base Case

> Economic Recovery: The economic recovery is underway with some significant potential headwinds: stalled fiscal aid, flu season ahead and election uncertainty rising.
> Signs of Slowing: Slowing in apparent in the labor markets, consumer spending and business investment.
> Lower for Longer: The newly adopted flexible average inflation target means the Fed will keep rates low even with tighter labor markets.
> Risks to Growth: With vaccines still making their way through trials, testing still insufficient and cases back on the rise, without further stimulus, risks are tilted to the downside.

## Base Case - Slow Recovery

| Forecast for United States <br> (Annual percentage changes unless specified) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
| GDP | 3.0 | 2.2 | -3.7 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 |
| Private Consumption | 2.7 | 2.4 | -4.2 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 2.7 |
| Fixed Investment | 4.8 | 2.3 | -2.8 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 2.3 |
| Government Consumption | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | -1.0 | -1.1 | 0.0 |
| Exports of Goods and Services | 3.0 | -0.1 | -13.5 | 4.8 | 8.5 | 5.5 |
| Imports of Goods and Services | 4.1 | 1.1 | -11.5 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 4.5 |
| Stockbuilding (\% of GDP) | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Industrial Production | 4.0 | 0.9 | -7.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 2.4 |
| Consumer Prices, average | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| Current Balance (\% of GDP) | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.7 | -2.7 | -2.4 | -2.3 |
| Federal Budget (\% of GDP) | -3.8 | -4.6 | -20.9 | -10.2 | -6.0 | -5.3 |
| Short-Term Interest Rates (\%) | 2.31 | 2.33 | 0.68 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| Long-Term Interest Rates (\%) | 2.91 | 2.14 | 0.87 | 1.12 | 1.54 | 1.81 |
| Exchange Rate (US\$ per Euro), average | 1.18 | 1.12 | 1.13 | 1.18 | 1.19 | 1.20 |
| Exchange Rate (Yen per US\$), average | 110.4 | 109.0 | 107.2 | 106.0 | 105.5 | 104.4 |



[^0]Entering slower \& bumpier phase of the recovery GDP Q4 2019 = 100


[^1]
## Base Case - Consumer Spending



US: Retail sales recovery remains uneven

- August gain Total change since Feb

Clothing \& Accessories Restaurants/Bars Gasoline Stations Miscellaneous Stores Electronics \& Appliances General Merchandise Furniture \& Furnishings Total
Motor Vehicle \& Parta Health \& Personal Care Core Food \& Drink Stores Sport, Hobbies, Books, Music Building Materials
Nonstore Retailers


US: Credit and debit card spending
\% difference from January 2020


## US: Services drag consumer spending down



## Base Case - Labor Markets



Source: Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics

US: August COVID-19 impact on the labor market


Source : Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics

US: Total inital claims for unemployment benefits Milions, nsa


[^2]
## Base Case - Business Investment

US: Business investment


US: Drivers of business investment growth


Source : Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics

US: Durable goods orders recovery incomplete

$$
\text { Total change since Feb } \quad \text { July gains }
$$



## Base Case - Monetary Policy




US: Federal Reserve Economic Projections


Source: Oxford Economics/Federal Reserve

US: Fed balance sheet
Trillions, \$


## Base Case - Fiscal Policy





## Base Case - International Trade

US: Real exports recovering, but still depressed \% yly (3m ma)


US: Travel spending still crushed at record lows \$billions


US: Real import trough flattered by gold influx \% y/y (3m ma)


US: Changes in exports and imports since Jan \$ billions, SA, annualized


## Scenario Set

ı. Premature easing: Pandemic accelerates where economy prioritized over health (probability =25\%): As lockdown fatigue leads to an early relaxation of social distancing measures in some countries, infections surge once more and severe public health restrictions return in the latter part of 2020.
II. Second wave: W-shaped recovery as global infections spike again in early 2021 (probability =15\%): A second coronavirus wave results in renewed lockdowns globally, peaking in early 2021, and a further period of severe economic weakness.
III. Financial crisis: Deep downturn creates credit crunch (probability =5\%): The post-pandemic period is characterized by limited credit supply, private sector deleveraging and public sector austerity, resulting in tepid productivity growth and anemic growth.
iv. Rapid upturn: Scientific advances mean reduced social distancing this year (probability =15\%): A more optimistic upside for the global economy in which recovery is more rapid and less permanent damage is inflicted on the global economy.

## Premature Easing

Trigger: Restrictions relaxed too early in vulnerable economies, driving surge in infections and renewed lockdowns. Localised lockdowns elsewhere.
Transmission: (i) Domestic demand recovery falters amid reintroduction of lockdowns, amplified by (ii) further rises in unemployment and (iii) renewed financial market weakness; (iv) world trade is hit, (v) weighing again on commodity prices. But 2021 recovery is robust as social distancing relaxes in Q1 as per baseline.

US: GDP



Eurozone: GDP


Source : Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics

## Second wave: W-shaped recovery

Trigger: Lockdowns return o/a 2nd wave in Q4/Q1. Transmission: (i) Domestic demand recovery falters amid reintroduction of lockdowns, amplified by (ii) further rises in unemployment and (iii) renewed financial market weakness; (iv) world trade shrinks once more, (v) weighing again on commodity prices. Recovery is relatively sluggish, reflecting (vi) risk aversion among households and businesses and (vii) more limited and less effective government support than in first wave.



Eurozone: GDP


## Financial crisis: Deep downturn creates credit crunch

Trigger: Financial crisis at the same time as governments undertake austerity measures.
Transmission: (i) Deeper recession than in the baseline, (ii) triggering financial crisis. (iii) More limited credit supply (iv) amplifies private sector deleveraging. (v) Public sector austerity exacerbate demand impacts. Recovery anaemic, partly reflecting (vi) continued household and business risk aversion and (vii) tepid productivity growth.



Eurozone: GDP


## Rapid upturn: Scientific advances mean reduced social distancing

Trigger: Confidence restored as advances allow early, full relaxation of social distancing.
Transmission: (i) Domestic demand recovers as restrictions ease, (ii) financial markets recover and (iii) governments with fiscal space provide fiscal stimulus from early 2021. (iii) World trade bounces back, fueling (iv) commodity price recovery. (v) Permanent damage to the global economy is less marked than in the baseline, with GDP marginally above Jan baseline in 2025.

US: GDP


World: GDP


Eurozone: GDP


## Scenario Results - Demand Factors




|  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathscr{M} \\ & \tilde{U} \\ & \mathscr{N} \\ & \tilde{\sim} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 3 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \sim \\ & \sim \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GDP (Growing) | 0.63 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.50 |
| Trade Volume (Growing) | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.50 |
| Earnings (Growing) | 0.63 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.63 |


|  | 잉 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | -16.4 | -16.4 | -16.3 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 |

## Scenario Results - Inflation Factors

CPI


80 WTI Crude Price


|  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathscr{\sim} \\ & \tilde{U} \\ & \ddot{\sim} \\ & \tilde{\sim} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 3 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \sim \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CPI (Increasing) | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.50 |
| Oil (Above Average) | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Dollar (Strengthening) | 1.00 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.63 | 1.00 |

## Scenario Results - Policy Factors

Policy Rates



|  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{0} \\ & \ddot{0} \\ & \stackrel{\omega}{\infty} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 3 \\ & 3 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rates (Rising) | 0.63 | 0.50 | 0.25 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Fed Balance Sheet (Expanding) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Asset Inflation (Positive) | 0.13 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.13 |



|  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | -8.0 | -16.4 | -16.5 |
| Absolute Portfolio Risk | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |

## Portfolio Scenario Preferences

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathscr{\sim} \\ & \tilde{0} \\ & \tilde{\sim} \\ & \tilde{0} \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{\pi}{0} \\ & \frac{\pi}{U} \\ & \frac{\pi}{0} \\ & \frac{\pi}{0} \\ & \stackrel{\Gamma}{E} \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Absolute Portfolio Exposure | 4.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 |
| Relative Portfolio Exposure | 1.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 |
| Drawdown Risk | 5.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 |
| Symmetry Risk | 1.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 |
| Scenario Preference | 2.8 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 |

## Portfolio Observations

> The SBCERA portfolio is designed to endure a slow recovery and or a reverse into economic lockdown well.
> However, the portfolio tail risk characteristics favor a slight downturn. The current base case scenario as well as a rapid up turn invite the potential for more volatility and larger drawdowns.
> The relative positioning of the current overlay portfolio provides some offset to the absolute positioning, providing some avenues for participation through the overweight in US, international and emerging market equity, which perform well is strong demand environments.
> The scenarios currently under consideration also generally assume weak oil prices and some positive inflation, both of which benefit the portfolio from an absolute as well as a relative perspective.
> Moreover, the positive inflation context provides some tail protection and very positive skew to the portfolio, which also favors the premature easing scenario over the base case.
> From a symmetry perspective, the worst scenarios are the second wave, which ranks as the worst overall scenario for the portfolio, and the financial crisis. Though, cash provides plenty of cushion to protect against these scenarios.

## Exhibit A: Page 53

## Appendix

Detailed Analysis

## Unfiltered Data from June 2000 to June 2020



| Strongest | Weakest |
| :---: | :---: |
| US Bonds | Foreign Stocks |
| Foreign Bonds | Private Equity <br> High Yield Bonds <br> Commodity |

## Demand - GDP Growing



## Demand - Trading Volume Growing



## Demand - Earnings Growth



## CPI Increasing



## Oil Above 3 Year Average



## Dollar Strengthening



## Rising Rates



## Fed Balance Sheet Expanding



## Asset Price Inflation Positive



## SBCERA Portfolio Absolute Preference

|  |  |  |  | 00 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \bar{\pi} \\ & \stackrel{0}{\circ} \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US Large Cap Equity | 14.7 | 14.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| US Small Cap Equity | 3.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | -0.4 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| International Equity | 10.9 | 10.8 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | -0.7 | -1.2 | -1.4 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Emerging Markets Equity | 7.9 | 7.8 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.1 | -0.1 | -0.3 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Global ex-US Fixed Income | 15.2 | 15.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| US Aggregate Fixed Income | 5.3 | 9.5 | -4.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| US High Yield Fixed Income | 9.6 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| European High Yield | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -0.2 | -0.7 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Emerging Markets Fixed Income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Diversified Venture | 10.5 | 9.3 | 1.2 | -1.3 | -1.1 | 1.0 | -1.9 | -3.3 | -3.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -1.0 | 1.0 |
| Buyout | 0.7 | 9.3 | -8.6 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.9 | -1.0 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Secondaries | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.2 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.9 | -1.0 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Direct Lending | 2.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Opprtunistic Debt | 2.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Real Estate | 4.6 | 5.3 | -0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Total Real Assets | 4.4 | 3.4 | 1.0 | -0.7 | -0.6 | -1.9 | -1.6 | -8.6 | -8.8 | 0.5 | -1.2 | -0.8 | 1.0 |
| Alpha Pool | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Cash | 6.4 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Portfolio | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -0.7 | -0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.0 |

## SBCERA Portfolio Relative Preferences

|  |  | .$ㅇ$ <br>  <br> 0.0 <br> 0. <br> 2 <br> 0 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0 \\ & \stackrel{0}{3} \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & 0.0 \\ & 00 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US Large Cap Equity | 14.7 | 14.5 | 0.2 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 22 | 15 | 18 | 22 | 18 | 19 |
| US Small Cap Equity | 3.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 26 | 23 | 17 | 21 | 24 | 16 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 23 |
| International Equity | 10.9 | 10.8 | 0.2 | 24 | 25 | 22 | 29 | 26 | 25 | 20 | 24 | 25 | 25 |
| Emerging Markets Equity | 7.9 | 7.8 | 0.2 | 14 | 16 | 18 | 24 | 18 | 21 | 16 | 23 | 21 | 22 |
| Global ex-US Fixed Income | 15.2 | 15.0 | 0.2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| US Aggregate Fixed Income | 5.3 | 9.5 | -4.2 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| US High Yield Fixed Income | 9.6 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| European High Yield | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18 | 15 | 16 | 22 | 20 | 28 | 25 | 18 | 16 | 17 |
| Emerging Markets Fixed Income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 9 |
| Diversified Venture | 10.5 | 9.3 | 1.2 | 30 | 30 | 23 | 30 | 29 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 30 | 30 |
| Buyout | 0.7 | 9.3 | -8.6 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 23 | 13 | 26 | 26 | 24 |
| Secondaries | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 26 | 25 | 23 | 13 | 26 | 26 | 24 |
| Direct Lending | 2.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| Opprtunistic Debt | 2.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| Real Estate | 4.6 | 5.3 | -0.7 | 25 | 26 | 24 | 12 | 17 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 15 |
| Total Real Assets | 4.4 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 28 | 30 | 31 | 28 | 30 | 29 | 28 |
| Alpha Pool | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 6 |
| Cash | 6.4 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Portfolio Rank Difference | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Overlay Portfolio | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 |

## SBCERA Portfolio Drawdown Preferences

|  |  |  |  | 000 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  | 000 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \bar{\oplus} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US Large Cap Equity | 14.7 | 14.5 | 0.2 | -17.5 | -17.5 | -17.5 | -9.5 | -17.5 | -17.5 | -9.1 | -17.5 | -17.5 | -17.5 |
| US Small Cap Equity | 3.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | -21.7 | -21.7 | -20.8 | -11.2 | -21.7 | -21.7 | -11.9 | -21.7 | -21.7 | -21.7 |
| International Equity | 10.9 | 10.8 | 0.2 | -20.2 | -20.2 | -20.2 | -14.5 | -20.2 | -20.2 | -11.5 | -20.2 | -20.2 | -20.2 |
| Emerging Markets Equity | 7.9 | 7.8 | 0.2 | -27.4 | -27.4 | -27.4 | -17.5 | -27.4 | -27.4 | -11.2 | -27.4 | -27.4 | -27.4 |
| Global ex-US Fixed Income | 15.2 | 15.0 | 0.2 | -1.7 | -1.7 | -1.4 | -1.7 | -1.6 | -1.7 | -1.7 | -1.6 | -2.1 | -2.1 |
| US Aggregate Fixed Income | 5.3 | 9.5 | -4.2 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.6 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.4 | -2.6 | -3.4 | -3.4 |
| US High Yield Fixed Income | 9.6 | 5.3 | 4.4 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -8.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -4.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 |
| European High Yield | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -24.2 | -24.2 | -24.2 | -12.0 | -24.2 | -24.2 | -11.5 | -24.2 | -24.2 | -24.2 |
| Emerging Markets Fixed Income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -14.9 | -14.9 | -14.9 | -6.8 | -14.9 | -14.9 | -4.2 | -14.9 | -14.9 | -14.9 |
| Diversified Venture | 10.5 | 9.3 | 1.2 | -28.4 | -28.4 | -28.4 | -18.6 | -28.4 | -28.4 | -18.6 | -28.4 | -28.4 | -28.4 |
| Buyout | 0.7 | 9.3 | -8.6 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -17.0 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -13.4 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -34.2 |
| Secondaries | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.2 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -17.0 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -13.4 | -34.2 | -34.2 | -34.2 |
| Direct Lending | 2.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -8.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -4.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 |
| Opprtunistic Debt | 2.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -8.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -4.0 | -15.9 | -15.9 | -15.9 |
| Real Estate | 4.6 | 5.3 | -0.7 | -31.4 | -31.4 | -31.4 | -15.1 | -31.4 | -31.4 | -9.0 | -31.4 | -31.4 | -31.4 |
| Total Real Assets | 4.4 | 3.4 | 1.0 | -21.3 | -21.3 | -21.3 | -14.7 | -21.3 | -21.3 | -10.6 | -21.3 | -21.3 | -21.3 |
| Alpha Pool | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -5.9 | -5.9 | -5.9 | -2.6 | -5.9 | -5.9 | -1.0 | -5.9 | -5.9 | -5.9 |
| Cash | 6.4 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Portfolio | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -16.4 | -16.4 | -16.3 | -9.9 | -16.4 | -16.4 | -8.0 | -16.4 | -16.5 | -16.5 |

## SBCERA Portfolio Symmetry Preferences

|  |  |  |  | 000 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  | 00 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \bar{\oplus} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US Large Cap Equity | 14.7 | 14.5 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| US Small Cap Equity | 3.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| International Equity | 10.9 | 10.8 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Emerging Markets Equity | 7.9 | 7.8 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Global ex-US Fixed Income | 15.2 | 15.0 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| US Aggregate Fixed Income | 5.3 | 9.5 | -4.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| US High Yield Fixed Income | 9.6 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| European High Yield | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Emerging Markets Fixed Income | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Diversified Venture | 10.5 | 9.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Buyout | 0.7 | 9.3 | -8.6 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Secondaries | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Direct Lending | 2.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Opprtunistic Debt | 2.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Real Estate | 4.6 | 5.3 | -0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Total Real Assets | 4.4 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Alpha Pool | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| Cash | 6.4 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 28.0 | 28.0 | 31.9 | 84.9 | 31.9 | 31.9 | 46.0 | 46.0 | 31.9 | 31.9 |
| Portfolio | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 |

## Exhibit A: Page 68

## Building Investment

 Excellence
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[^0]:    Sources: Orford Economics

[^1]:    Source: Oxford Economics

[^2]:    Source : Oxford Economics/Haver Analytics

